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abstract
Public sector bureaucracies are key players in advanced economies, as in 
the case of European Union countries, for the smooth functioning of the roles 
assigned to the governments (to provide welfare state services and benefits, 
public infrastructures, and to design the legal and economic institutional 
framework). From this perspective, a proper functioning of bureaucratic 
bodies is crucial for potential growth. Thus, cross-country differences in the 
quality of bureaucracies can explain differences in economic growth among 
them. Accordingly, the operation of self-interested bureaucracies can lead to 
inappropriate fiscal policies, regulatory capture, and labor market misallocation, 
damaging incentives and causing large efficiency costs. The aim of this paper is 
twofold. Firstly, we review the extant literature, focusing on the main channels 
of the bureaucracy-growth relationship. And secondly, we provide an empirical 
exercise that illustrates the links between bureaucratic/institutional quality and 
economic growth. 
Keywords: Public Sector Bureaucracies; Economic Growth; Institutional 
Quality; Public-private Wage Gap.
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resumen
Las burocracias del sector público son actores clave en las economías 
avanzadas, como en el caso de los países de la Unión Europea, para el buen 
funcionamiento de los papeles asignados a los gobiernos (proporcionar 
servicios y prestaciones del Estado de Bienestar, infraestructuras públicas y 
diseño del marco jurídico y económico institucional). Desde esta perspectiva, 
el buen funcionamiento de la burocracia pública es crucial para el crecimiento 
potencial. Por lo tanto, las diferencias entre países en la calidad de las 
burocracias pueden explicar las diferencias en el crecimiento económico. En 
consecuencia, la existencia de “burocracias con intereses propios” puede llevar 
a políticas fiscales inadecuadas, a la captura regulatoria o al mal funcionamiento 
del mercado laboral, dañando los incentivos y generando importantes costes 
de eficiencia. Dos son los objetivos de este artículo. En primer lugar, revisamos 
la literatura existente, centrándonos en los principales canales de la relación 
entre burocracia y crecimiento. Y en segundo, ofrecemos un ejercicio empírico 
que ilustra los vínculos entre la calidad burocrática/institucional y el crecimiento 
económico.
Palabras clave: burocracias del sector público; crecimiento económico; 
calidad institucional; brecha salarial público-privada.
JEL Classification: H11; H41; H83.
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1. introduction2
Almost one hundred years after the publication of Weber’s work on bureau-
cracies (Weber, 1922), the debate about what should be its role in improving 
the welfare of societies still deserves a wide attention from the literature. There 
are currently two approaches, quite dichotomous, when analyzing the role 
played by bureaucracies in modern advanced economies.
On the one hand, as Rosen and Gayer (2014) point out, any modern 
government simply cannot function without bureaucracy, since bureaucrats 
provide essential technical expertise in the design and execution of public 
programs. In addition, its permanence over time provides an essential 
institutional memory, in the face of the transience of politicians, while its 
recruitment based on merit guarantees an impartial treatment of citizens and 
prevents corruption. Consequently, from this perspective, a proper functioning 
of bureaucratic bodies is essential for the institutional framework to act correctly, 
and therefore, crucial for the economic and social functioning of a society.
However, on the other hand, it would be very naïve to accept that bureau-
crats do not have more interests and objectives than those revealed by citizens 
to the political representatives in the electoral processes (Rosen and Gayer, 
2014). In the late sixties of the 20th century, faced with the Weberian vision 
of the bureaucracy, a new interpretation of bureaucratic behavior emerged, 
and became the predominant approach within the Theory of Public Choice: 
self-interested bureaucracies (versus common-interest-based), in which civil 
servants, at every level of hierarchy, act rationally to pursue their own interests.
The economic growth implications of both families of theories are dramatically 
different. Thus, cross-country differences in the quality of bureaucracies can 
explain, to a large extent, differences in economic growth among countries. And 
certainly, proxy measures of “bureaucratic quality” show significant heterogeneity 
among countries world-wide (see Figure 1 3,4).
2 The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank 
of Spain or the Eurosystem. J. Onrubia acknowledges the financial support of Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2016-76506-C4-3-R). Sánchez-Fuentes acknowledges 
the financial support of the Regional Government of Andalusia (project SEJ 1512).
3 Quality of government: the mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, where higher values indicate higher quality of government. Corruption is an 
assessment of corruption in the political system. Law and Order assesses the strength and impartial-
ity of the legal system as well as the popular observance of the law. Bureaucratic Quality measures 
the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy.
4 Government effectiveness (Worldwide Governance Indicators): Government effectiveness captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its in-
dependence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
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Figure 1: cross-country heterogeneity in the quaLity and eFFectiveness oF governments
Quality of government Government effectiveness
SOURCE: Quality of government: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Teorell et al. (2015).
Government effectiveness: Worldwide Governance Indicators.
The aim of this note is to review the main channels through which the 
“quality of bureaucracies” affect economic growth. We do so in section 2 (review 
of the literature, including by zooming-in a particular model). Then, in Section 
3 we provide some (suggestive) evidence on the positive relationship between 
better bureaucratic/institutional quality and more robust medium-run economic 
growth. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Literature review
2.1 bureaucracies as institutionaL promoters oF economic growth
The literature on economic growth has traditionally paid a great deal 
of attention to the role played by institutions, especially focusing, in recent 
years, on its quality. A significant number of papers conclude that, in general, 
the positive impact of “good” institutions on economic growth increases with 
its quality. See, among others, North (1989, 1990), Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003), 
Glaeser et al.  (2004), Rodrik et al.  (2004), Helpman (2008), Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya (2006), or Knutsen (2013).
The economic concept of institutions, though, is quite broad (see North, 
1989, 1990, for the definition usually followed in economics), and certainly 
broader than that of “bureaucratic quality”. A concept related to the later, as 
mentioned above, is that of “quality of government” (on the determinants of 
the latter, see for example La Porta et al. (1999). Focusing on the functioning 
of bureaucracies as economic institutions, Rauch and Evans (2000), in a study 
for 35 public sectors corresponding to less developed countries, find that meri-
tocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of bureaucratic 
performance. Instead, the influence of competitive salaries, internal promo-
tion and career stability cannot be clearly contrasted. These results were ob-
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tained controlling for country income, level of education, and ethnolinguistic 
diversity. From another perspective, but on related grounds, Savoia and Sen 
(2015) review the strengths and limitations in current empirical research on 
the measurement of state capacity, starting from the idea, increasingly wide-
spread, that this capacity is essential for effective governance, and a crucial 
element of long-run economic development. Indeed, they find significant em-
pirical evidence supporting these claims. State capacity, following Besley and 
Persson (2011) is defined as “the institutional capability of the state to carry 
out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms”. 
A reasonable list of state capacities would include the following: bureaucratic 
and administrative capacity; legal capacity; infrastructural capacity; fiscal ca-
pacity, understood as the state’s ability to raise revenues from taxes; and mili-
tary capacity. As determinants of the state capacity, the overview conducted 
identifies the following: length of statehood; external conflicts; legal origins; 
colonization strategy; inequality; structure of the economy; economies foreign 
aid-dependent; fractionalization, understood as social divisions along ethnic, 
linguistic and religious lines; incentives and type of recruitment of the bureau-
cracy; and political democracy.
Another line of research in this area examines how, and to what extent, well-
functioning governments promote economic growth, in particular, by focusing 
on the quality of the institutional design that governs the functioning of the 
public sector. Governance may influence economic performance through dif-
ferent channels. One key channel is the functioning of bureaucracy. As Rauch 
(1995) points out, bureaucracy encourages investment in public infrastructure 
with long-term payoffs rather than present consumption. Behind this result lies 
the professionalization of bureaucracy, which contributes to making the pro-
fessional careers of bureaucrats more stable and predictable, facilitating the 
adoption of decisions consistent with long-term objectives. Evans and Rauch 
(1999) also find that processes based on systematic rules used in bureaucratic 
decision-making should increase the effectiveness of infrastructure projects, 
especially those more complex, involving different departments responsible 
for public policy. Moreover, on the side of private investment, these authors 
establish that a stable bureaucracy significantly reduces the risks associated 
with the uncertainty that would be expected from a highly changing public 
policy management.
At the same time, authors such as Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro 
(1995), Campos et al. (1999), or Dahlström et al. (2012), highlight that bu-
reaucracy and its professionalization mitigate opportunities for corruption 
which, in turn, stimulates private investment. Dahlström et al. (2012) find that 
meritocratic recruitment is a key factor in explaining the reduction of corrup-
tion, using a sample of fifty two countries. Instead, other allegedly relevant 
bureaucratic factors, such as public employees’ competitive salaries, career 
stability, or internal promotion, would not have a significant impact. Hence, as 
they say, the use of a recruitment process based on the skills of the candidates 
is the most important bureaucratic feature for deterring corruption.
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2.2 seLF-interested bureaucracies might be detrimentaL to economic growth
In opposition to the instrumental vision of the bureaucracy as an engine 
to economic growth and social welfare, a part of the Public Choice literature 
offers a more negative view. The main idea behind the latter view is that self-
interested bureaucracies induce an excessive supply of public activity, oversiz-
ing the public sector. According to Mueller (2003), the premise of self-interest 
rules out direct concern for the welfare of others. Possibly, the most well-known 
contribution in this field is Niskanen’s theory of the bureaucrat as “budget 
maximizer” (Niskanen, 1968, 1971). According to the seminal formulation of 
this theory, based on the budget process, acting in their capacity as monopo-
lists, bureaucrats try to maximize the size of the budgets allocated to their 
departments, agencies or management units. Behind this behavior would be 
the target level of remuneration, professional promotion, prestige, or simply 
the quest for a greater power of action. All these targets are positively linked 
to the amount of the budget managed by a specific group of bureaucrats. The 
informational advantage of bureaucrats, derived from their professional exper-
tise and knowledge of production technology, allows them to propose to the 
policy-makers projects with budgets that are oversized compared to the ones 
that would results from the optimization of social welfare.
This “dark side” of the bureaucratic power has been analyzed from a princi-
pal-agent approach by Döhler (2018). This article concludes that the informa-
tive advantages that characterize the moral hazard scenario in which the con-
ventional model of self-interested bureaucracies is developed, not only affect 
the bureaucrats (the agent of the relationship), but also the political leaders 
who approve the proposals of those (the principal of the relationship). Then, 
principal’s moral hazard should also be considered as a potential explanation 
for political-bureaucratic interactions. Empirical evidence for three German 
regulatory agencies, responsible for drug control, financial services and rail 
safety, is founded: the political principal acted negligently to suppressing cru-
cial information. The author identifies this situation as the dark side of power 
because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility.
In the field of economics, in addition, recent developments in the theory 
of bureaucracy have evolved towards the postulates of the economic theory 
of organizations, especially towards the analysis of the problems of incentives 
existing in public provision, including those of their financing and regulation 
(González-Páramo and Onrubia, 2003). Tirole (1994) and Martimort (1996) 
have analyzed the multi-principal nature of the public sectors, determining its 
consequences on organizational behaviour. Laffont (2000) extends this analy-
sis to the design of the basic institutions that structure democratic systems, 
taking into account the separation of powers and mechanisms of check and 
balances. Among the results of this new approach, stand out those that con-
clude that the limitation of the power of bureaucrats to approve ineffective and 
overfunded projects involves the design of independent institutions in charge 
of the control, supervision and monitoring of public spending.
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Finally, a recent literature that distinguish between public and private 
employment, focusing on public-private wage determination, also provides a 
framework in which the strategic behavior of an insider group within the public 
administration extract a rent by benefit from some form of market power. For 
example, in some papers (see, e.g. Fernández-de-Córdoba et al., 2012, and 
the references quoted therein) wages in the public sector are determined as 
the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the union of public sector 
employees and a government that cares about total employment. If the public 
sector union or control group derive monopoly power from a tighter control of 
the production of public goods/services, then a public sector wage premium 
emerges, and employment (public and private) is lower that otherwise. Along 
the same lines, the notion of a “fragmented government”, whereby the govern-
ment consists of a variety of independent firms is also present in Kollintzas et al. 
(2018a) (see also the references quoted therein). The later authors, in particu-
lar, develop an insiders-outsiders theory whereby those groups of agents work 
for public (cartel) and private (competitive) sector firms, respectively, while the 
government is influenced by insiders in setting public policies. Kollintzas et al. 
(2018b) provide empirical support to these theories, in particular for the case 
of Greece. Moreover, the existence of a premium of public over private wages, 
that emerges even when controlling for individual characteristics, is by now 
an empirical regularity (see Giordano et al., 2015, and the references quoted 
therein). In addition, a number of studies find that the emergence of a wage 
premium can partly be rationalized by political-economy variables, including 
the degree of “bureaucratic quality” (see Campos et al., 2017; Kollintzas et al., 
2018b; and the references quoted therein).
The economic growth and employment implications of such a wage gap, 
when not explained by economic factors, are significant. An increase in 
vacancies in the public sector causes labor flows from the private sector if a 
positive public-private wage gap exists, which leads to an increase in private 
sector wages and a potential reduction of private sector employment. At the 
same time, the strength of the crowding-out increases with the degree of 
substitutability in the provision of goods and services by the public and the 
private sectors (see e.g. Maley and Moutos, 1996). The increase of public jobs 
to produce highly substitutable products can directly displace private jobs. 
However, if public and private products are complements, there exists the 
possibility of crowding-in if the public service improves the marginal product of 
labor in the private sector.
Some policy proposals have been recently put forward to reduce the wage 
gap. Some theoretical papers (see e.g. Economides et al., 2015; Gomes, 2018; 
Ujhelyi, 2014) show that establishing parity between work conditions in the 
public and the private sectors can be welfare-improving under certain condi-
tions, and/or inspect the benefits of civil service rules, exploring the conditions 
under which the existence of tenured “bureaucrats” raises or decreases overall 
economy welfare.
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2.3 a Focus on some theoreticaL channeLs
in this section we provide a discussion using the model of Fernández-de-
Córdoba et al. (2012). The aim is to illustrate how output (“economic growth”) 
and employment behave after a given macroeconomic shock in economies 
that differ in their “bureaucratic” structure, along the lines discussed in the 
previous section. In particular, we want to illustrate the output and employment 
implications in economies with different “public-private wage gaps” and different 
degrees of public-private sector complementarity/substitutability.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the key element of the model 
is that those authors consider an objective function for the government that 
results from a bargaining process between the government and a public sector 
union (“bureaucrats”), leading to a public sector objective function that encom-
passes the maximization of public wages and public employment. The inclusion 
of the union is necessary for the existence of a wage premium in that set-up. 
In addition, the model considers a production function that relates output with 
three inputs: private and public employment, and the capital stock. The choice 
of the production function implies that a positive level of taxes is necessary to 
finance the public sector wage bill. The government raises taxes to finance the 
public sector wage bill, and selects unilaterally public employment and public 
employees’ wages. As for the rest, the model is a quite standard neoclassi-
cal, dynamic general equilibrium piece, to be solved to obtain the competitive 
equilibrium. The model economy has three agents: Households, firms, and the 
government. The behavior of households is modeled in a standard fashion. 
Firms have access to a technology that encompasses, as mentioned before, 
three inputs: capital, private employment, and public employment. Thus, labor 
supply is divided into a private and a public workforce.
As to some details on the more relevant elements of the model for our pur-
poses, first let us pose the production function. In Fernández-de-Córdoba et al. 
(2012)’s framework, the technology is given by
                          (1)
where Yt is aggregate output, Kt is capital, Lp,t private employment, Lg,t 
public employment, At is a measure of total factor productivity (modeled in a 
standard way as an AR(1) process), α is the physical capital share of output, 
µ measures the weight of public employment relative to private employment 
and σ=1/(1-η) is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between public 
and private labor inputs. The parameter η indicates the elasticity of technical 
substitution between private and public labor. Bt is the relative efficiency level 
of private labour.
The second element of relevance for our purposes is the description of the 
public sector and its interactions with the private sector. The government levies 
discretionary taxes to finance spending, pays the public sector wage bill Wg,t 
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Lg,t and balances its budget period-by-period. The authors posit an objective 
function for the government as the solution of a game between a public sector 
union, that cares about the wage of public sector employees (“the insiders”), 
and a government which cares about the level of public employment given its 
budget constraint. Thus, the government chooses employment and wages to 
minimize the following objective function, subject to its budget constraint:
                                     (2)
Where ω is the weight given to wages. If ω is close to zero, then the main 
goal of the government is to maximize public employment, whereas if ω is 
close to one, the main goal of the government is to maximize public wages (the 
insiders / public sector union’s preferred option). This function implies that the 
government maximizes both public wages and employment.
In this framework, the output response to a TFP shock (a 1-standard-devi-
ation shock to the AR(1) process of At) is completely standard, overall, as in 
a standard real business cycle model without the distinction between private 
and public sector employment: the shock raises output on impact, as more 
output is produced for given factor inputs. Hours worked also increase as the 
return to work increases, raising output further. Additionally, due to the direct 
effect of the shock on output, private labor productivity increases on impact. 
The capital stock also increases given the rise in its productivity.
But the distinction between public and private labor is instrumental to 
elaborate on the crowding-out induced by the “bureaucrat” (public trade 
union). Private labor increases, as a result of the increase in productivity. At the 
same time, the shock increases tax revenues and, therefore, the government 
can increase the total public wage bill by raising the number of employees and 
their average wages. The effect on public employment is larger than the one 
on private employment. Thus, the TFP shock produces a “crowding-out” effect 
as there is a substitution of private employment by public employment. The 
extent of the “crowding-out” depends on the value of ω, the weight that the 
government attaches to wages per employee: in the limit, if ω =1, incumbent 
public employees gets and increase in wages, causing an increase in the wage 
premium, while public employment does not react to the shock.
As regards the dynamics of wages, private wages go up as a result of the 
increase in productivity. Given the increase in tax revenues and the objective 
function of the government, public wages also increase. Nonetheless, given the 
existence of public-private pay gap, the flow of employees from the private 
sector to the public sector cause a larger effect on private wages than on public 
wages, leading to a gradual reduction of the transitory change in the relative 
prices of labor between the private and the public sectors.
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3. some empiricaL evidence
In this Section we turn to providing empirical evidence on the linkage be-
tween “bureaucracy” and economic growth, to complement the discussion in 
the previous sections. In particular, we estimate regressions in which we link 
measures of bureaucracy with economic growth. From the previous analysis, 
some proxy measures of “bureaucratic quality” stand out: (i) the public sector 
pay premium over the private sector, discussed in depth in the previous sec-
tions; (ii) the indicator of government effectiveness; (iii) the indicator of govern-
ment quality. The latter two variables have been described in the Introduction. 
The next section deals with the empirical measures of the pay premium.
3.1 the “wage gap” data
We use aggregate data to compute measures of the “public-private 
pay gap”. In line with the extant literature (see, e.g. Lamo et al., 2012; 
Campos et al., 2017), we use a standard Eurostat and OECD data for 
the 19 countries selected to build up a consistent dataset for the period 
1970-2014. The countries in our sample are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, UK, and the 
USA. The main disadvantage of using macro pay gaps is that one cannot 
control for the individual characteristics of the labor force. Given that public 
sector employees tend to be more educated or present more experience on 
average (among other characteristics, see e.g. Campos et al., 2017), macro 
pay premiums tend to be larger than micro ones. We will address this bias in 
line with the previous literature, by performing our subsequent regressions 
in first differences, hence removing this bias in levels. Despite the presence 
of this shortcut, in our case, macro wage gaps have the advantage of being 
available for long time periods, which is what we need to capture slow-moving 
institutional features of the countries at hand.
The measure of wages chosen for our analysis is compensation per employee 
in nominal terms. The selection of total compensation, rather than wages, is 
related to data availability: the information available on wages is quite limited 
in terms of both sample size and coverage of the countries in our sample. 
We compute compensation per employee using employee compensation and 
employment data. Private-sector employee compensation of private sector 
employees is defined as total economy employee compensation minus the 
compensation of government employees. Compensation per private employee 
is defined as private employee compensation divided by total economy 
employment. In turn, the compensation and employment of government 
employees do refer to the General Government definition. The latter is a more 
accurate definition of the government sector than the standard approach in 
many studies that focus on micro data of using non-market activities (NACE 
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sectors O, P, and Q). So-called non-market activities do incorporate private 
sector employees, in particular in sectors P and Q (Health and Education).
The literature has shown that public-private wage gaps can partly be ex-
plained by other institutional features, such as the quality of the government or 
its efficiency (see the discussion of the previous sections). Given that the aim of 
the empirical exercise is to test, in an agnostic way, different proxy measures of 
“bureaucratic quality”, we purge the measures of pay gap from other, related, 
institutional factors. To do so, we proceed in two steps. In the first step we 
identify the long-run determinants of the dynamics of the public pay gap, by 
running the following regression (in this step we replicate Campos et al., 2017):
                             (3)
where  is the change in the public-private pay gap between t and t-1; are 
changes in possible determinants of the dynamics of the wage gap namely, 
percentage of public employees, openness of the economy to trade, the share 
of public employees in Public Administration (core measure, NACE O classifica-
tion, used as a proxy of “insider’s” monopoly power), the proxy for the quality 
of government, and the variable measuring government effectiveness. In turn, 
are period fixed-effects. The estimation is carried out by pooled OLS. As in the 
literature on long-term economic growth, in order to remove the effects of the 
business cycle, each period is a five-year average. The results are displayed 
in Table 1. The different sample length in each regression is due to individual 
country and variable availability.
In a second step, using the models estimated in columns (1) to (4) of Table 
1 we compute , from each model:
                             (4)
The calculated  are the “purged” versions of the wage gap that we will use 
in the model of the next subsection. Beyond the usefulness for the calculation 
of these residuals, the results in Table 1 show two relevant elements for the 
aims of the current paper, that are in line with the insights of the literature and 
the theoretical model of the previous section: (i) in our pool of countries and 
sample, an increase in the quality of government is associated with a lower 
pay gap, controlling for other factors; (ii) the same happens with government 
effectiveness.
3.2 empiricaL exercise
We run the following regression linking the long-run evolution of economic 
growth and a number of measures of bureaucratic quality (in turn each one), 
controlling for some macroeconomic factors (unemployment rate, openness, 
government debt):
132 Jorge onrubia, Javier J. Pérez, a. Jesús sánchez-Fuentes
             (5)
tabLe 1: Long-run determinants oF the pubLic pay gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ General Government Sector Wage Gap ct
∆% Public Employees ct
-0.0178** -0.0087 -0.018** -0.034**
(0.0068) (0.0183) (0.0089) (0.0162)
∆ Openness ct
-0.0016** -0.0021** -0.0016** -0.002**
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006)
∆% Public Administration Employees ct
1.4048
(1.3675)
∆ Quality of Government ct
-0.2457**
(0.1320)
∆ Government Effectiveness ct
-0.1631**
(0.0630)
Five-Years Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Period 1975-2014 1980-2014 1985-2014 2000-2014
Observations 146 56 110 57
Adjusted R-squared 0.281 0.134 0.206 0.36
Notes: This table is a partial replication of Table 5 in Campos et al. (2017) (own elaboration). The 
table shows the regression of five-years changes in the public-private wage gap on five-year changes 
of some of its long run determinants. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: 
*: 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%.
As before, the estimation is carried out by pooled OLS and, in order to 
remove the effects of the business cycle, each period is a five-year average.
The results are shown in Table 2. Some results are worth highlighting: (i) the 
measures of public-private pay gap (computed from equation 4) present the 
expected negative sign (see columns (1) to (4)), i.e. a medium-run increase in 
the monopoly power of bureaucrats (as measure by the pay gap), net of other 
institutional elements, is associated to a reduction of the growth rate of real 
per capita GDP; (ii) the estimates are computed with high uncertainty, in part 
probably due to the short sample, and are statistically significant only in 2 out 
of 4 cases; (iii) the other two measures of bureaucratic quality (columns (5) and 
(6)) also display the correct, ex-ante, sign: an increase in government efficiency 
goes hand-in-hand with an increase in medium-run economic growth, and the 
same applies to the indicator or government quality; nonetheless, both coef-
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ficients are estimated with significant noise, and are not statistically significant 
at the usual confidence levels.
tabLe 2: Long-run Link between economic growth and quaLity oF bureaucracy measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ∆ Per capita Log Real GDP ct
∆ Bureaucracy ct
-0.0796 -0.1309** -0.0937* -0.0708 0.0015 0.1231
(0.0501) (0.0608) (0.0522) (0.1049) (0.0483) (0.1274)
∆ Openness ct
0.0015** -0.0001 0.0015** 0.0003 0.001** 0.0015**
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
∆ Unemployment 
rate ct
-0.0103** -0.0095** -0.0108** -0.009** -0.0097** -0.0104**
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0032)
∆ Debt ct
-0.0011* -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0009*
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005)














Observations 66 33 62 30 45 66
Adjusted R-squared 0.881 0.826 0.879 0.766 0.839 0.878
Notes: This table shows the regression of five-years changes in real per capita GDP on five-year 
changes of country characteristics linked to indicators of bureaucracy. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Significance levels: *: 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%.
Overall, thus, we find suggestive, though weak evidence, of the associa-
tion between our measures of bureaucratic quality and economic growth. It is 
worth mentioning that the results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed 
effects as an additional control (not shown).5 In addition, Figure 2 shows that 
the association of each variable of interest with real per capita GDP growth is 
not driven by outliers, although the estimation in each case comprises only a 
few periods (three 5-year periods). On the contrary, in the case of government 
effectiveness, one observation (ES, to the left) determines the lack of statistical 
significant of the result.
5 Instead of using country fixed effects, we preferred to include in our baseline scenario some explanatory 
variables regarding socioeconomic and institutional framework for our selection of countries.
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Figure 2: partiaL correLation between proxy measures oF bureaucratic quaLity and economic growth
Public-private wage gap: residual (1) Public-private wage gap: residual (2)
Public-private wage gap: residual (3) Public-private wage gap: residual (4)
Government Effectiveness Quality of Government
4. concLusions
We review the main channels through which the “quality of bureaucracies” 
affect economic growth. The literature shows that public sector bureaucracies 
are key players in modern advanced economies, in particular for the smooth 
functioning of the roles assigned to the government sector, such as the provi-
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sion and organization of welfare state services, and the implementation of the 
(economic) institutional framework, including as regards the tax code and the 
guarantees of legal certainty for economic agents. From this perspective, a 
better quality of bureaucracy is favorable for potential economic growth. Thus, 
cross-country differences in the quality of bureaucracies can explain, to a large 
extent, differences in economic growth among them.
In our paper we also provide some (suggestive) evidence on the positive 
relationship between bureaucratic/institutional quality and economic growth.
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